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Published failure rate values from the US Tritium 
Systems Test Assembly, the Japanese Tritium Process 
Laboratory, the German Tritium Laboratory Karlsruhe, 
and the Joint European Torus Active Gas Handling 
System have been compared.  This comparison is on a 
limited set of components, but there is a good variety of 
data sets in the comparison.  The data compared 
reasonably well.  The most reasonable failure rate values 
are recommended for use on next generation tritium 
handling system components, such as those in the tritium 
plant systems for the International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor and the tritium fuel systems of 
inertial fusion facilities, such as the US National Ignition 
Facility.  These data and the comparison results are also 
shared with the International Energy Agency cooperative 
task on fusion component failure rate data.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tritium fuel handling for fusion facilities is an 
important safety issue.  Inadvertent releases of tritium 
from the fuel cleanup, handling, and storage facility of a 
fusion experiment can be a dominant contributor to off-
site radiological dose.  Analyzing the reliability of the 
system equipment and the secondary confinement barriers 
can lead to improvements in system safety and also prove 
the regulatory case that the public is protected from 
exposure to tritium.  Improved tritium confinement also 
protects facility workers and the environment.  Existing 
tritium facilities operated for fusion research have 
considered reliability field experience data to be valuable 
enough to devote time and resources to collecting and 
analyzing the component failure information.  These 
facilities include the Tritium Systems Test Assembly 
(TSTA) in the US, the Joint European Torus (JET) Joint 
Undertaking in the United Kingdom, the Tritium Process 
Laboratory (TPL) in Japan, and the Tritium Laboratory 
Karlsruhe (TLK) in Germany.  The safe operation of these 
facilities, and the quantitative fault modeling of near-term 
designs that has been made possible by data collection 
activities, serve to demonstrate that fusion tritium 
handling systems and facilities are a mature technology 
that should not contribute significantly to the accident risk 
of a fusion experiment.  Some safety personnel have 
suggested that this effort to collect and analyze tritium 
component data may be misplaced since tritium facilities 
for other purposes have already been licensed and 
operated.  Most notably, military and commercial fission 
power reactor tritium removal facilities in several 
countries have been granted permission to operate by their 
governments.  The distinction must be made that military 
facilities are not licensed by energy development 
agencies, and commercial fission reactor tritium facilities 
such as those in Canada do not perform all of the tritium 
separation and removal tasks as fusion facilities, and they 
are licensed by fission reactor authorities.  Any 
experiences or data that these other facilities can share 
with fusion can be very valuable, but fusion facilities will 
need to demonstrate their own safety.  Making the fusion 
regulatory case for tritium usage is expected to progress 
in increments, proving each successive step.  This “stair 
stepping” has been seen with JET (site limits 0.1 g-T for 
the Preliminary Tritium Experiment and an administrative 
limit of 20 g-T for the Deuterium-Tritium Experiment)1,2
and the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR, 5 g-T site 
limit) experiences3 in magnetic fusion, and with the 
National Ignition Facility in inertial fusion.4  An ITER-
size tritium facility (< 3 kg-T site limit)5 is another step 
forward for fusion and is expected to require a rigorous 
safety assessment.  JET required both traditional and 
probabilistic safety analysis for tritium operations.  Both 
JET and TFTR have demonstrated the value of 
probabilistic safety assessment for tritium systems, and 
the ITER design team has also used PSA techniques in the 
tritium systems safety assessment.6
The data that have been collected and analyzed from 
fusion tritium facilities are shared with task participants in 
the International Energy Agency’s Implementing 
Agreement on the Environmental, Safety and Economic 
Aspects of Fusion Power (IEA/ESE-FP).7,8  The operating 
experience task in the IEA/ESE-FP gathers data from 
existing facilities for application to probabilistic safety 
assessment of the next successive step in fusion.  Several 
tokamaks share data, including JET, the Frascati 
Tokamak Upgrade, Tore Supra, TFTR, and DIII-D.  Other 
data values are found from records kept at other fusion 
facilities, such as the tritium labs.  Literature sources and 
safety reports also supply data.  Applicable data are also 
borrowed from other endeavors, such as the fission 
power, aerospace, and chemical process industries.  
Together, these data sets allow quantification of accidents 
in fusion facilities, which is part of the regulatory process 
in the US and some other countries. 
This paper gives the results of a comparison of data 
values collected from TSTA, TPL, JET, and TLK.  It is an 
extension of previous work that compared only US and 
Japanese data.9  The comparison process helps to validate 
the data and make selections of best estimate values.  The 
data values presented here compared reasonably well.   
II.  DATA VALUES 
Two objectives of the TSTA mission were to 
demonstrate the long-term safe handling of tritium and to 
demonstrate the long term reliability of components.10  In 
late 1999, the US Department of Energy (DOE) 
determined that the TSTA mission was complete and an 
orderly shutdown of the facility began in 2001.  Facility 
stabilization was completed in 2003 and final cleanup is 
in progress.  The component failure data records 
remaining at the site were electronically transmitted to the 
INEEL in August 2003 for inclusion in an update of the 
failure rate data values.  Detailed examination of the 
transmitted data revealed that these electronic records 
were from the database inception in 1983 to the time that 
the KnowledgeMan database manager program originally 
used to store and sort the failure report data11,12 was 
converted to the R-base program for data storage.  The 
conversion occurred in early 1990.  Therefore, the 
transmitted records believed to be an update of past 
information were of limited use since they had already 
been included in past data analyses.  It appears that the 
post-1990 data may have been lost.  Despite the inability 
to perform a significant update on the TSTA component 
failure rate data values, comparing the collected data sets 
from TSTA13-16 and other facilities remains a valuable 
exercise to validate the data. 
Pinna17 has reported on an extensive data analysis 
performed on JET and TLK.  Yamada et al.18,19 have 
reported two data sets on TPL.  The second TPL data set 
has expanded some of the initially reported values and 
also examined some new components.  The mean, or 
point estimate, failure rate values from the sets of failure 
reports or other recorded data at a given facility are given 
in Table I.  Where relevant, both TPL data values are 
reported for a given component; the more recent values 
are used for comparison since longer periods of operating 
time generally result in more accurate failure rates.  The 
second set of TPL values usually are smaller than the 
initial set.  The table shows the expected result that some 
data values are very similar and some disagree.  The IEA 
data task participants have concurred that values which 
agree to within a factor of 3 are considered a good 
comparison, those values that agree to within a factor of 
10 are a fair comparison, and those values that vary more 
than a factor of 10 are a poor comparison.8  On a general 
level, facilities of similar age with similar types and 
numbers of components, and with similar duty factors and 
maintenance, usually produce comparable failure rate 
data.  There can be many factors that affect individual 
results and make facility-to-facility comparisons poor, 
such as the influence of environmental conditions, the 
methods or style of component and system operation, and 
the maintenance approach of corrective versus predictive 
versus preventive.  The TSTA data spans, on the order of 
6 or more years of operation, are large enough for 
continuously operated components to produce mature 
failure rate values.   
Some components listed in Table I do not have 
entries from each facility analyzed.  Some facilities did 
not collect information on some types of components, and 
the data analyses did not focus on some types of 
components or systems.  For example, from Table I it is 
obvious that TSTA and TPL researchers collected and 
analyzed glovebox data, while the JET and TLK analyses 
did not.  Conversely, the JET analysis focused more on 
electronics while the TSTA, TPL, and TLK analyses did 
not.  As more data are collected, broader sets of 
components can be analyzed and compared. 
Failure rate comparisons are not easily made due to 
differences in components, differences in data reporting, 
and variations in the analysis.  One example of reporting 
differences is the identification of failure modes.  As seen 
in Table I, some components had ‘all failure modes’ 
failure rates, and other failure rate values had more 
specific modes.  Often this discrepancy is due to the level 
of detail recorded in the component failure report and on a 
few occasions it is due to the chosen analysis technique of 
binning all of the data for an aggregate result.  Overall,
the number of ‘good’ comparisons was slightly higher 
than the number of fair and poor comparisons combined.  
Thus, the data compared reasonably well. 
The values in Table I show that in general, some of 
the JET data produced the lowest values, in the 1E-06 and 
1E-07 per hour range, while the TSTA and TPL data 
generally compare more closely in the 1E-05 per hour 
range.  The JET Active Gas Handling System (AGHS) 
has not operated differently than the other facilities, and 
the components used at JET are believed to be similar to 
the other facilities.  It is possible that the AGHS had 
larger populations of components, or perhaps the AGHS, 
being a fusion fuel processing system at a tokamak 
facility, had the impetus of experiment operations 
concerns that made maintenance more intensive than at 
the laboratory facilities.   
TABLE I.  Tritium component failure rate comparison 
Component and 
failure mode 
TSTA 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) 
TPL 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) 
JET 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) 
TLK 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) Comparison 
Blower,  
fail to function 
-- 7.3E-05/h 
(1.9E-04/h) 
2.2E-05/h 
(4.6E-05/h) 
-- fair 
Gas
chromatograph, 
fails to function 
6.8E-02/d 
(1.6E-01/d) 
-- -- 5.81E-06/h 
(1.46E-05/h) 
[all modes] 
not comparable 
Motor operated 
valve, fails to 
open 
5.0E-04/d 
(8.5E-04/d) 
-- -- 2.06E-05/h 
(6.49E-05/h) 
all modes 
not comparable 
Compressor, 
fails to start 
3.1E-05/d 
(9.5E-05/d) 
1.1E-04/d 
(1.2E-04/d) 
5.2E-05/d 
(5.67E-05/d 
assumed) 
-- -- good,  
later TPL data to 
TSTA data compares 
well 
Compressor, 
fails to run 
6.3E-05/h 
(1.6E-04/h) 
8.1E-04/h 
(2.1E-03/h) 
fail to function 
7.4E-04/h 
(1.93E-03/h 
assumed) 
failure 
-- 3.62E-05/h 
(1.72E-04/h) 
fails to run 
good, for TSTA data 
to TLK data, 
otherwise TPL data is 
much higher 
Manual valve, 
fails to operate 
1.8E-03/d 
(3.2E-03/d) 
9.8E-04/d 
(5.4E-03/d) 
fails to function 
-- -- good 
Humidity 
indicator, gives 
incorrect value 
1.7E-05/h 
(3.9E-05/h) 
2.1E-05/h 
(3.9E-05/h) 
9.8E-07/h 
(1.4E-06/h) 
indicator, erratic 
 good, for TSTA to 
TPL data; JET much 
lower 
Pressure 
transducer, gives 
incorrect value 
5.3E-06/h 
(1.4E-05/h) 
-- 4.3E-07/h 
(1.3E-06/h) 
transducer, 
erratic
 poor 
Recombiner, 
fails to function 
4.2E-05/h 
(1.3E-04/h) 
-- -- -- -- 
Room air 
monitor,  
reads high 
2.2E-06/h 
(1.0E-05/h) 
1.1E-05/h 
(2.2E-05/h) 
fails to function 
8.8E-07/h 
(4.2E-06/h) 
ion chamber, 
erratic or no 
output 
-- TSTA data to JET 
data good, TPL data 
is much higher 
Room air 
monitor,  
reads low 
2.2E-06/h 
(1.0E-05/h) 
1.1E-05/h 
(2.2E-05/h) 
fails to function 
8.8E-07/h 
(4.2E-06/h) 
ion chamber, 
erratic or no 
output 
-- TSTA data to JET 
data good, TPL data 
is much higher 
TABLE I.  Continued. 
Component and 
failure mode 
TSTA 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) 
TPL 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) 
JET 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) 
TLK 
point estimate 
and 
(upper bound) Comparison 
Glovebox 
pressure 
controller, 
overpressure 
3.0E-01/year 
(4.0E-01/year) 
2.9E-02/year 
(1.4E-01/h) 
fails to function 
6.9E-02/year 
(3.3E-01/year 
assumed), 
negative pressure 
control failure 
-- --  
poor
Glovebox 
pressure 
controller, 
underpressure 
2.0E-01/year 
(3.0E-01/year) 
2.9E-02/year 
(1.4E-01/year) 
fails to function 
6.9E-02/year 
(3.3E-01/year 
assumed), 
negative pressure 
control failure 
-- --  
poor
Glovebox 
pressure 
controller, 
continuously 
purges 
4.0E-02/year 
(1.0E-01/year) 
6.9E-02/year 
negative pressure 
control failure 
-- -- good 
Glovebox, air 
inleakage 
1.0E-01/year 
(5.0E-01/year) 
1.14E-01/year 
(2.6E-01/year) 
-- -- good 
Glovebox, small 
scale tritium 
release to room 
4.0E-02/year 
(1.0E-01/year) 
 -- -- -- 
Oxygen monitor, 
all failure modes 
3.4E-07/h 
(2.3E-06/h) 
7.2E-06/h 
(1.3E-05/h) 
fails to function 
3.0E-06/h 
oxygen sensor 
failure 
-- --  
fair 
Small 
compressor, fails 
to run 
6.3E-05/h 
(1.6E-04/h) 
8.1E-04/h 
(2.1E-03/h) 
-- -- poor 
Small 
compressor, fails 
to start 
3.1E-05/d 
(9.5E-05/d) 
1.1E-04/d 
(1.2E-04/d) 
-- -- poor 
U getter bed with 
heaters 
-- -- -- 8.04E-04/h 
(2.02E-03/h) 
all failure modes 
-- 
ZrCo getter bed 
with heater 
-- -- -- 1.53E-02/h 
(3.84E-02/h) 
all failure modes 
-- 
Molecular sieve 
bed
-- -- -- 3.56E-07/h 
(8.94E-07/h) 
all failure modes 
-- 
As an initial approach to obtaining generic failure 
rates, the values in Table I were combined using a 
geometric mean to produce average failure rates.  Then 
the values were rounded up to the nearest half-order of 
magnitude.  The upper bounds are 90 or 95% confidence 
interval values.  These failure rates and their error bounds 
are considered to be the generic average based on the 
operating experience of the facilities.  The results are 
given in Table II.  These generic failure rate values can be 
used for preliminary safety assessment when components 
are not well defined or do not have input data from the 
manufacturers.  Pinna17 also reported some generic values 
based on the JET AGHS data results. 
III.  CONCLUSIONS 
The collection of system and component operating 
experience at multiple facilities has allowed analysts to 
calculate component failure rates for tritium-bearing 
components.  These are truly fusion-specific data sets, and 
they allow direct application of probabilistic safety 
assessment to fusion tritium systems.  These data are 
more accurate and applicable to fusion than analyst 
judgment, generic gas system data, or tritium system data 
from military or other applications.  Collecting the 
operating experience data is an important part of proving 
that tritium can be handled safely for fusion experiments 
and having these data advances the state-of-the-art for 
probabilistic safety assessment in fusion applications.  
The data can support facility-specific uses, such as a 
safety assessment update needed when petitioning to 
increase the allowable tritium inventory.  The data values 
in Table I compared reasonably well, although in a few 
cases there were large variations in the data.  For 
components that have wide variation in values, using 
generic results may offer the best quantification unless 
facility-specific data are to be used.  The generic failure 
rates given in Table II can also be used for preliminary 
safety assessments when only the types of system 
components are known.  All of these data can be shared 
with the IEA/ESE-FP task on component failure rate data 
collection for safety support.  
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TABLE II.  Generic tritium component failure rates 
Component and 
failure mode 
Generic 
failure rate 
Upper bound 
failure rate 
Blower,  
fails to function 
3E-05/h 1E-04/h 
Compressor,  
fails to start 
3E-05/d 1E-04/d 
Compressor,  
fails to run 
1E-04/h 3E-04/h 
Manual valve,  
fails to operate 
1E-03/d 3E-03/d 
Humidity indicator,  
incorrect output 
1E-05/h 3E-05/h 
Pressure 
transducer,  
incorrect output 
1E-06/h 3E-06 
Room air monitor,  
reads high 
3E-06/h 1E-05/h 
Room air monitor,  
reads low 
3E-06/h 1E-05/h 
Glovebox pressure 
controller, 
overpressure 
1E-01/year 3E-01/year 
Glovebox pressure 
controller, 
underpressure 
1E-01/year 3E-01/year 
Glovebox pressure 
controller, 
continuous purge 
1E-01/year 3E-01/year 
Glovebox,  
air inleakage 
1E-01/year 3E-01/year 
Oxygen monitor, 
all failure modes 
1E-06/h 3E-06/h 
Small compressor, 
fails to run 
3E-04/h 1E-03/h 
Small compressor, 
fails to start 
3E-05/d 1E-04/d 
note: /h is per operating hour, /d is per demand to function 
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